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In order to make sense of the “bloom-
ing, buzzing, confusion” of a world where
no two objects or events are ever exactly
identical, infants form categories of per-
ceptually distinct items that can be treated
equivalently. The study of categorization
often arises from one of two motiva-
tions: (1) to examine the mechanisms
by which infants learn to treat distinct
objects/events as equivalent (e.g., how an
infant comes to name two different ani-
mals dog) and (2) to examine the cur-
rent state of an infant’s knowledge (e.g.,
does an infant have a category of dog?).
As an illustration, consider Quinn et al.’s
(1993) study. After habituating to different
dog pictures, 3- and 4-month-olds do not
dishabituate to cats. However, after habit-
uating to cats, they do dishabituate to dogs.
If we were examining the current state
of knowledge, what should we conclude?
Unless we want to suggest these infants
are participants in Schrödinger’s thought
experiment (1935)—they both have and
do not have a cat category—we can-
not say anything conclusive. Instead, the
results reveal something important about
the mechanisms of categorization. Quinn
et al. (1993) showed variability between
category members affects the exclusivity
of the categories infants form. This exam-
ple demonstrates that studying whether
infants have a category misses the crucial
point that categories are neither things that
people have in their heads nor that exist
in the world; but rather categorization is a
process (see also Oakes and Madole, 2000;
Samuelson and Smith, 2000; Samuelson
et al., 2007).
In addition to these two main motiva-
tions, the study of categorization typically
utilizes one of two methodologies: (1)
looking measures, e.g., habituation and
preferential looking, and (2) touch-
ing/reaching measures, e.g., sequential
touching or manual forced choice mea-
sures. What I will argue in this paper is
that looking measures (1) too readily lend
themselves to interpretations of infants
having a category or not, and (2) miss the
importance the body and physical context
have on development.
A TEMPTATION OF LOOKING
Too often the focus of looking measures
is the outcome—do infants look longer
at one stimulus—without regard for how
past experiences and the present context
influence infants’ looking (but see, Perone
and Spencer, 2013). Interpretations that
infants do or do not have a category
have proven to be particularly tempting
in studies examining infants’ categoriza-
tion of physical events (see also Haith,
1998). For example, evidence that 3 to
4-month-old infants habituated to a ball
rolling behind an occluder dishabituate
to an impossible event—a ball rolling
behind an occluder and not stopping at
a barrier—has been interpreted as evi-
dence for infants having knowledge of
physical laws of solidity (Spelke et al.,
1992). However, in experiments employ-
ing reaching measures, when a ball rolls
behind a panel of doors and stops at a
barrier to the right of one of the doors,
older children fail to select the correct
door, instead perseveratively reaching for
the same door regardless of the barrier
location (Berthier et al., 2000). This fail-
ure makes it difficult to say whether infants
have knowledge of physical laws.
However, failure can tell us some-
thing more interesting about development
(Keen, 2003; Perry et al., 2008, 2009).
For example, Perry et al. (2009) demon-
strated changes in children’s ability to
align their body and movements with
relevant spatial reference frames support
search accuracy. When 2-year-olds under-
went training with the barrier in a fixed
position while the ramp moved, such
that the correct door was aligned with
midline, they correctly located the object
during the standard testing procedure.
The context of children’s environment—
where their bodies are relative to objects
and events in the world—influences
where they attend and subsequently
remember. Such findings demonstrate
that the context of learning is critical to
understanding developmental change—
findings that would not have been made
through looking measures. This real-
ization can be applied to the study of
categorization.
The widespread use of habituation
beginning in the 1980smeans thatmuch of
our knowledge about infants’ categoriza-
tion comes from their visual exploration
of (often) static images (or occasionally
visual stimuli in the context of auditory
stimuli). Looking measures offer advan-
tages over touching/reaching measures.
They can be used with young infants
with poor motor control; and computer
displays allow increased precision in stim-
uli construction and presentation. The
ability to conduct experiments with a
variety of age groups and with high pre-
cision has benefited the study of many
developmental phenomena, including
categorization.
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However, looking methods can only tell
us about categorization of visual or audi-
tory stimuli. A growing body of evidence
suggests that word learning and catego-
rization are often closely tied to other per-
ceptual and sensori-motor aspects of the
learning context (see e.g., Samuelson et al.,
2011; Perry et al., 2014). Additionally, the
particular task used to measure catego-
rization matters. For example, researchers
investigating basic and superordinate-level
categorization discovered infants generally
form broader categories (corresponding
to adult-defined superordinate-level cate-
gories such as animal and vehicle) dur-
ing touching tasks (see e.g., Mandler and
Bauer, 1988; Mandler et al., 1991; Mandler
and McDonough, 1993; and see Mandler,
2000 for review) and narrower categories
(corresponding to adult-defined basic-
level categories such as horse and zebra)
during looking tasks (see e.g., Roberts and
Cuff, 1989; Behl-Chadha, 1996; and see
Mandler, 2000 for review). Thus, rely-
ing solely on looking measures therefore
provides an incomplete picture of cate-
gorization. Next, I discuss evidence from
one particular type of categorization—
novel noun generalization—that illus-
trates an essential role for manual actions
in learning.
NOVEL NOUN GENERALIZATION: A
TEST CASE FOR TOUCHING
Children develop word-learning biases
that help them generalize novel names
to novel objects. By 2-years-old, chil-
dren typically generalize names of novel
solid objects by similarity in shape (shape
bias). By 4-years-old, they typically gener-
alize names of novel non-solid substances
by material (material bias). Researchers
debate what generalization by shape or
material similarity says about the role
of perceptual and conceptual informa-
tion in children’s category learning (see
Samuelson and Bloom, 2008). The atten-
tional learning account proposes biases
emerge out of associations between per-
ceptual and linguistic regularities (e.g.,
Samuelson and Smith, 1999; Yoshida and
Smith, 2005; Perry and Samuelson, 2011).
On the other hand, knowledge-based
accounts argue biases are driven not by
lower-level regularities but higher-level
knowledge about, e.g., functions and core
properties (Hammer and Diesendruck,
2005; Kemler Nelson and 11 Swarthmore
College Students, 1995). Importantly, both
accounts recognize the effects of context
in categorization. For example, children’s
tendency to demonstrate the shape bias
(Hammer and Diesendruck, 2005) and the
material bias (Samuelson and Horst, 2007)
varies with the specific stimuli and task
used. Context-dependency is not a prob-
lem of a task that needs to be removed,
however, but a fact of categorization.
Categorization is not static, but emerges
as prior knowledge is brought to bear in
a given context (see e.g., Samuelson et al.,
2007). Converging evidence supporting
this view also suggests an important role
for manual action in categorization.
Smith (2005) found that the actions
children performed on an object influ-
enced how they generalized its name.
When 2-year-olds were told a novel object
was a “wug” and taught to move it up
and down, they generalized the name
to an object elongated on the vertical
axis rather than one elongated on the
horizontal axis. Critically, the child had
perform the actions, as children in a con-
dition who watched the experimenter per-
form the action did not systematically
select objects elongated consistent with the
movement (Smith, 2005). By examining
children’s manual interactions with real,
physical objects, these results demonstrate
that the actions children perform with
objects determine what information they
use for categorization.
Similarly, Perry et al. (2014) found
that children’s understanding of non-solid
substances (e.g., pudding) is influenced
by context-dependent actions. At home,
toddlers primarily learn about non-solids
during mealtimes, when they sit in a high-
chair and can touch and eat non-solid
foods.When 16-months-olds sat in a high-
chair in the laboratory, they were more
likely to messily touch novel substances
than those seated at a table. The messier
children were, the more likely they were to
generalize names of novel non-solid sub-
stances by material. The highchair is a cue
to a context-dependent action pattern sup-
porting attention to material. Critically,
children who did not touch the substances
failed to generalize novel names by mate-
rial, suggesting looking is not enough.
We would miss important discoveries if
we only used looking measures to study
children’s novel noun generalization.What
the touching method afforded was the
ability to see how children learn about
material.
Together these studies reveal context
is not a factor to eliminate from experi-
ments, but instead an inseparable part of
categorization. Responses in these stud-
ies were measured via touching (which
object/substance did the child hand to
the experimenter). Nevertheless, contrast-
ing touching (or amount of touching in
Perry et al.’s study) with looking dur-
ing learning revealed children’s manual
actions determine the information they
use to generalize. Moreover, by showing
how critical actions are to learning, these
studies provide evidence for the useful-
ness of employing touching measures in
studying categorization.
WHY TOUCHING MATTERS
Mandler (2000) proposed an important
difference between looking- and touching-
based tasks: infants are more interested
in and more actively explore objects than
static images. Infants develop and explore
within a world full of rich multimodal
information. Indeed, even adults’ per-
ception of familiar objects is influenced
by manual exploration (Lederman and
Klatzky, 1990; Yee et al., 2013). Embodied
cognition theorists posit exploration and
the multimodal nature of experiences
are critical to development (Thelen and
Smith, 1994; Smith and Gasser, 2005).
Redundant information across modalities
(e.g., visual, haptic) facilitates learning of
more abstract information (see Bahrick
et al., 2004).
Cross-modal redundancy is especially
useful for understanding shape and mate-
rial. As an infant explores a toy, hap-
tic information is integrated with visual
information. Over development, explo-
ration changes representation of that toy’s
shape, and objects’ shapes in general (e.g.,
Soska et al., 2010). The ability to recog-
nize an object by its shape, is a critical
precursor to developing a shape bias (Yee
et al., 2012). As infants explore non-solids,
there is similarly redundant sensory infor-
mation. Nonsolid substances are particu-
larly difficult to recognize by vision alone
(cf. Adelson, 2001)—e.g., visual similar-
ity between milk and glue is high, while
haptic similarity is low. Over development,
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exploration increases infants’ ability to
learn subtle visual cues associated with dif-
ferent materials—critical for categoriza-
tion of non-solids (see also, Perry et al.,
2014).
Given how important multimodal
interactions are to development, we as
a field cannot rely on looking measures
at the expense of what can be learned
studying categorization in the context of
real objects. Looking measures focus-
ing only on learning outcomes cannot
reveal the processes driving categoriza-
tion. Nevertheless, looking measures
have a place in the study of categoriza-
tion. As critical as touching is to infants’
development, not every question is a
touching question. Studies examining
where infants look during learning have
provided important insights into what
infants glean from a given context and
subsequent effects on object perception
(Johnson et al., 2004) and categorization
(Best et al., 2013). Studying looking as
an exploratory process and not just an
index of cognition—whether using eye-
tracking or traditional habituation—will
be a fruitful complement to studies of
manual exploration.
CONCLUSIONS
Categorization is a critical process by
which we make sense of the world.
Importantly, when children learn about
individual categories, they are also learn-
ing higher-order regularities between cat-
egories, changing the way they learn cate-
gories in the future (e.g., Perry et al., 2010).
Thus, studying children’s categorization is
valuable in understanding how knowl-
edge and learning change over time. Given
that knowledge is dynamically constructed
with information from multiple senses,
inseparable from context, and children are
developing within a world where they are
engaging these senses, we miss something
important if we only study categorization
using looking measures. As a field, we can-
not ignore the richness of children’s every-
day actions and experiences; therefore,
we must engage a variety of methodolo-
gies to understand development and the
categorization process.
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